GHSA-m9hv-hvwf-5qh7: Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length

GHSA ID

GHSA‑m9hv‑hvwf‑5qh7

CVE ID

CVE‑2026‑102725

Severity

High

CWE

CWE-125

Published

2026‑11‑01

Last updated

2026‑11‑01

Affected packages

Package Vulnerable versions Patched versions

NetX Duo

>= 6.4.0, ⇐ 6.5.2.202603a

6.5.2.202603b

Description

Summary

The NetX Duo MSRP parser takes the attribute list length of each message from the received frame and uses it to index event and end-mark bytes without comparing it with the length of the packet. An unauthenticated station on the same Layer 2 segment can send a short MSRP frame declaring a long list and make the MRP worker read far past the received packet.

Details

nx_msrp_mrpdu_parse() walks the messages of an MRPDU. For each one it reads the 16-bit attribute list length from the frame, then reads the packed event bytes at offsets derived from that length and tests the two end-mark bytes that follow the list. None of these offsets, nor the offsets of the attribute values it reads, is checked against nx_packet_length or the end of the packet data.

A declared list length of up to 65535 therefore moves the event and end-mark reads up to about 64 KB past a frame of a few bytes. If the end marks are not found, the walk advances to the next message by the same untrusted length and repeats, so it continues until it meets two end-mark bytes, reads a message header it rejects, or faults. Bytes read past the packet are also interpreted as attribute values and events and passed to the MRP state machines.

Impact

An unauthenticated station on the same Layer 2 segment can make the MRP worker read memory beyond the received packet. On a target with memory protection, or where the read reaches unmapped memory, the MRP worker faults, which on most targets stops MSRP processing or resets the device. Where the read does not fault, out-of-bounds bytes can be registered as MSRP attributes; no path returning them to the attacker has been identified.

Affected configurations

Applications built with NX_ENABLE_VLAN that initialize SRP with nx_srp_init(). MRP traffic is not routed, so the attacker must be on the same Layer 2 segment or VLAN.

Affected versions: [6.4.0, 6.5.2.202603a]. 6.4.0 introduced the TSN components.

Severity

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, CVSS-B 7.1 (High). CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.

The configuration requirement is stated above rather than scored as an attack requirement: one frame is sufficient and nothing depends on a race.

Patches

Fixed in NetX Duo 6.5.2.202603b. Before reading them, nx_msrp_mrpdu_parse() now checks that the packet is not chained or empty, and that it holds each message header, vector header and attribute list, with the value, events and end mark each list’s type requires. Malformed MRPDUs are refused with NX_INVALID_PACKET, and MRPDUs delivered as chained packets with NX_MSRP_NOT_SUPPORTED. The parser also now starts at the end of the Ethernet header instead of a fixed offset, so VLAN-tagged frames are parsed correctly. A new regression test covers empty and truncated frames, list lengths of 0, 1 and 0xFFFF, exact fits and chained packets; it faults without the fix.

Credits

Found by SecMate automated analysis (https://secmate.dev/). Reported by VulnCheck. Fixed by Frédéric Desbiens.

The fix and regression test were produced with AI assistance under human review, in accordance with the Eclipse Foundation’s Generative AI Usage Guidelines.