GHSA-jq4g-x753-4cc6: NULL Pointer Dereference on MSRP Attribute Table Exhaustion

GHSA ID

GHSA‑jq4g‑x753‑4cc6

CVE ID

CVE‑2026‑102723

Severity

High

CWE

CWE-476, CWE-772

Published

2026‑11‑01

Last updated

2026‑11‑01

Affected packages

Package Vulnerable versions Patched versions

NetX Duo

>= 6.4.0, ⇐ 6.5.2.202603a

6.5.2.202603b

Description

Summary

The NetX Duo MSRP implementation keeps its attributes in a fixed table of ten entries. When the table is full, nx_msrp_attribute_find() writes through the null pointer returned by the allocator before it checks for it, so an unauthenticated station on the same Layer 2 segment can fault the MRP worker thread by declaring enough new attributes. Talker Failed declarations make this easier: each one takes a table entry that is never released.

Details

For an attribute not already registered, nx_msrp_attribute_find() calls nx_mrp_attribute_new() to take a free entry from the static msrp_attribute_array, whose size is NX_MSRP_ATTRIBUTE_ARRAY_MAX_SIZE (10). When no entry is free, nx_mrp_attribute_new() returns NX_NULL. The caller then stores the attribute type and copies the attribute value through the returned pointer, and only afterwards tests it for NX_NULL, so the check never protects the case it exists for.

nx_msrp_mrpdu_parse() calls nx_msrp_attribute_find() for each Talker Advertise, Listener, Domain and Talker Failed declaration it receives. A sender can therefore fill the table with Talker Advertise or Domain declarations carrying distinct stream or class identifiers, and the next new declaration faults. For a Talker Failed declaration, nx_msrp_attribute_find() allocates an entry, marks it in use and then returns NX_MSRP_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ERROR without linking it into the participant’s list. The entry is never found again or freed, so every Talker Failed declaration permanently consumes one entry, and ten of them exhaust the table.

Impact

An unauthenticated station on the same Layer 2 segment faults the MRP worker thread, which on most targets stops MSRP processing or resets the device. The faulting accesses are small writes at low addresses carrying a few attacker-supplied bytes; on a target whose memory map places writable memory at address zero they corrupt that memory instead of faulting. Even without the fault, leaked entries deny MSRP registration to legitimate talkers and listeners until the device restarts. No confidentiality impact has been identified.

Affected configurations

Applications built with NX_ENABLE_VLAN that initialize SRP with nx_srp_init(). MRP traffic is not routed, so the attacker must be on the same Layer 2 segment or VLAN.

Affected versions: [6.4.0, 6.5.2.202603a]. 6.4.0 introduced the TSN components.

Severity

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, CVSS-B 7.1 (High). CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference; CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime.

The configuration requirement is stated above rather than scored as an attack requirement: once SRP is running, the attack needs no race or other condition outside the attacker’s control.

Patches

Fixed in NetX Duo 6.5.2.202603b. nx_msrp_attribute_find() now checks the result of nx_mrp_attribute_new() before using it, and releases the entry when it refuses the attribute type, so a Talker Failed declaration no longer consumes the table; nx_msrp_mrpdu_parse() stops at such a declaration. A new regression test fills the table, declares a further attribute through the parser and through the domain and listener requests, and parses 20 Talker Failed declarations; it faults without the fix.

Credits

Found by SecMate automated analysis (https://secmate.dev/). Reported by VulnCheck. Fixed by Frédéric Desbiens.

The fix and regression test were produced with AI assistance under human review, in accordance with the Eclipse Foundation’s Generative AI Usage Guidelines.