GHSA-7c5f-gmpm-f655: Missing HelloVerifyRequest cookie validation in the NetX Secure DTLS server

GHSA ID

GHSA‑7c5f‑gmpm‑f655

CVE ID

CVE‑2026‑106465

Severity

Medium

CWE

CWE-290, CWE-406

Published

2026‑10‑13

Last updated

2026‑11‑01

Affected packages

Package Vulnerable versions Patched versions

NetX Duo

>= 6.0, ⇐ 6.5.2.202603

6.5.2.202603a

Description

Summary

The NetX Secure DTLS server sends a HelloVerifyRequest carrying a freshly generated cookie, but never checks the cookie a client returns. The ClientHello parser copies the client’s cookie bytes over the value the server issued, and the server then decides whether the client has been verified from the cookie’s length alone. A peer that puts any single cookie byte in its first ClientHello skips the verification exchange entirely, so the server has no return-routability check and answers forged source addresses with its full handshake flight.

Details

_nx_secure_dtls_send_helloverifyrequest generates a 20-byte random cookie, stores it in nx_secure_dtls_cookie on the session, and sends it to the client. RFC 6347 section 4.2.1 expects the client’s next ClientHello to echo that cookie and the server to continue only if the echoed value matches the one it issued.

_nx_secure_dtls_process_clienthello instead reads the cookie length from the message and copies the client’s cookie bytes into nx_secure_dtls_cookie — the same field holding the value the server generated. The issued cookie is destroyed before any comparison could be made, and no comparison is attempted anywhere in the DTLS implementation.

The state decision at the end of that function rests on the length only: a cookie length of zero sends a HelloVerifyRequest, and any non-zero length proceeds directly to _nx_secure_dtls_send_serverhello. A first ClientHello declaring a one-byte cookie therefore reaches the ServerHello flight without any exchange having verified that the client can receive at the address it claims.

Impact

A remote peer can begin DTLS handshakes from a forged source address, and the server answers each with its full first flight. This reflects amplified traffic at a third party: a ClientHello of roughly fifty bytes, sent with a victim’s source address, elicits ServerHello, Certificate, ServerKeyExchange and ServerHelloDone, whose certificate chain alone is usually one to four kilobytes.

The server’s own session pool is not protected by the cookie check. The server allocates a session for the first datagram from any new source, before a cookie is issued, so forged datagrams exhaust the pool whether or not the returned cookie is compared. That defect is GHSA-3p2g-x7hh-3w4c (CVE-2026-115215). An earlier version of this advisory attributed pool exhaustion to this defect and stated that its fix closed it; it does not.

Confidentiality and integrity are not affected. The handshake itself still fails without the cryptographic credentials.

Affected configurations

Any build providing a NetX Secure DTLS server. The defect is in the common DTLS ClientHello path and is not behind a build option. DTLS clients do not process ClientHello messages and are unaffected.

Affected versions: [6.0, 6.5.2.202603].

Severity

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L, 6.9, Medium. CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing; CWE-406: Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification).

The vulnerable system’s availability is not scored: the session-pool exhaustion occurs before any cookie is exchanged and is scored in GHSA-3p2g-x7hh-3w4c. The reflected amplification harms a third party, so it is recorded as a low subsequent-system availability impact. No attack requirements are recorded: one forged datagram is sufficient and nothing about the path depends on a race.

Patches

Fixed in NetX Duo 6.5.2.202603a.

The server now retains the cookie it issued and compares it against the one the client returns, continuing only on a match. No public API changes, so applications need no source change.

NetX Duo 6.5.2.202603b replaces this comparison with a stateless cookie as part of the fix for GHSA-3p2g-x7hh-3w4c: the server allocates a session only for a ClientHello that returns a valid cookie, which also closes the session-pool exhaustion.

Workarounds

None within the DTLS server. Ingress filtering that prevents source-address forgery reduces exposure upstream of the device, but does not restore the verification the cookie exchange is meant to provide.

Credits

Found by Frédéric Desbiens while reviewing the DTLS ClientHello parser.

The analysis in this advisory and the fix were produced with AI assistance under human review, in accordance with the Eclipse Foundation’s Generative AI Usage Guidelines.