GHSA-2wwp-ffgp-6ggj: Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read

GHSA ID

GHSA‑2wwp‑ffgp‑6ggj

CVE ID

CVE‑2026‑102726

Severity

High

CWE

CWE-125, CWE-835

Published

2026‑11‑01

Last updated

2026‑11‑01

Affected packages

Package Vulnerable versions Patched versions

NetX Duo

>= 6.0, ⇐ 6.5.2.202603a

6.5.2.202603b

Description

Summary

The NetX Duo PPP IPCP code extracts addresses from a peer’s Configure-Nak without validating the length of each option. A zero-length option makes the parsing loop run forever, stalling the PPP thread and taking the link down, and an address option shorter than six bytes makes it copy bytes from past the option, which the device then sends back to the peer in its next Configure-Request.

Details

_nx_ppp_ipcp_response_extract() is called when a Configure-Nak arrives in reply to the device’s own Configure-Request. The receive path has already checked that the IPCP length field matches the packet, but the function walks the options inside it using each option’s own length byte, taken from the packet, both to reduce the remaining length and to advance its index. With an option length of zero neither value changes, so the while (length) loop never ends and the PPP thread never yields.

For the IP address, primary DNS and secondary DNS options, the function copies four address bytes starting two bytes into the option without checking that the option is six bytes long or that four bytes remain in the packet. An IP address option declaring a length of two at the end of the message makes it copy four bytes from past the received data into nx_ppp_ipcp_local_ip. The device then sends a new Configure-Request carrying that address, returning the four bytes to the peer; the DNS options store bytes read the same way into the DNS server addresses.

Impact

A malicious PPP peer can stall the PPP thread indefinitely with one malformed Configure-Nak, losing the PPP link and any other work on that thread until the device is restarted. The same peer can read up to four bytes of packet-buffer memory per exchange back from the device, a limited disclosure of whatever earlier traffic or data occupied that memory.

Affected configurations

Applications that use the NetX Duo PPP component with IPv4, in either role. The attacker must be the PPP peer; where PPP authentication is required, the peer must complete it before IPCP runs, but authentication does not affect the parsing defect.

Affected versions: [6.0, 6.5.2.202603a].

Severity

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, CVSS-B 7.1 (High). CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read; CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop').

The PPP link and IPCP negotiation are the configuration that makes the device vulnerable, so they are stated above rather than scored as an attack requirement. PR:N reflects deployments without PPP authentication; where the peer must authenticate, PR:L applies and the score is CVSS-B 7.0 (High).

Patches

Fixed in NetX Duo 6.5.2.202603b. _nx_ppp_ipcp_response_extract() now stops at an option shorter than its two-byte header or longer than the rest of the message, and takes an address only from an option of exactly six bytes, skipping other lengths. A new regression test parses crafted Configure-Nak options followed by marker bytes under a watchdog, and fails without the fix.

Credits

Found by SecMate automated analysis (https://secmate.dev/) and by @adawn0106. Reported by VulnCheck. Fixed by Frédéric Desbiens.

The fix and regression test were produced with AI assistance under human review, in accordance with the Eclipse Foundation’s Generative AI Usage Guidelines.